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Thp author deals with matters of ethics of our technological civilization and describes 
their main characteristics. As a kind of applied ethics engineering ethics has become of 
central importance because establishing sustainable growth requires new way of thinking: 
Related to high technology a new type of engineering responsibility is being born. 
This applied ethics is not brand-new. It induces an application of general traditional 
moral principles and a way to preserve them. 
Describing general characteristics of human beings the article argues for the neces-
sity of law and ethics as basic forms of social control of human actions. Related to our 
technological civilization the author establishes the need for a new kind of ethics. Accept-
ing the concept developed by Jonas the author outlines a future oriented responsibility 
ethics. The need for that is based on moral consequences of using modern technology, this 
great power. 
The need for engineering ethics is a result of a historical development: the engi-
neering occupation has become profession. 
The article ends up with analyzing the IEEE code of ethics taken as model for 
others. 
Keywords: ethics, applied ethics, engineering ethics. 
1. Technological Development and Ethics 
1.1. Why Do We Need Law and Morality? 
Some people ask me: Living in a world without morality why do we speak 
about ethics? Under present circumstances many people, firms, institutions 
are oriented toward short-term survival and they do not care about interests 
of others. Rough selfishness is a widespread attitude among citizens of our 
country. Some people want to survive the crisis at the expense of their 
fellow citizens. 
1 The research had been supported by the Research Support Scheme of the Central Euro-
pean F niversi ty. 
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Besides there is a great confusion of social values and norms in H un-
gary. The obvious value crisis makes us uncertain about relevance of moral 
evaluation for our survival. I think it would be misleading to identify a 
crisis situation with a normal one and it is worth considering the issue 1ll 
general. 
As a'starting point we can accept the idea that human beings can 
survive only if they cooperate. And there is no cooperation without equity 
and justice. As H. L. A. Hart pointed out it is not necessary to assume 
that there is an inherent human feature like 'will to survive' it is enough to 
take this as a contingent, historical fact. Humans can act in another way: 
the self destruction is also an option. INe have to assume that humans are 
interested in life. 
There are some general truths about nature and environment which 
support certain norms of law and moral. "Vithout these norms survival 
as minimum aim cannot be realized. If these norms are not followed then 
there is no reason for observing any other norm. 
Such norms form the common core of legal and moral concepts in any 
society where law and morality provide social control. These 
accepted norms of behaviour based on the above-rnentioned truth about 
humans, their natural environment and intentions can be taken as minimal 
content of a modest and acceptable naturalla"w. 
According to Hart they are as foHows: 
1. Humans are vulnerable. 
2. are nearly equal. This virtual equaiity indicates no situation 
could arise in which a human is to dOD11nate or oppress others 
alone, without help. 
3. The altruisil1 of hur.nans is limited. li UD1ans are an 
and a 'devil'. 
The qu.aIltlty available In 
a minin1urn form institu tionalized property. 
0. The and of hUTI1anS are lir.nited. 
the consequences Hart 
sanctions. These not TI10tivatioll 
also guarantee of the intec'ests of volunteer to obserVe 
norms. Otherwise these ",0'07,1,0 would be at risk to be deceived and maIllj..)-
dated. 
The threats of this situation require people to cooperate voluntarily 
vV'ithin an enforced order , 1961). 
Now I can respond to the question. "Ve human beings need morality and 
law for control of our activity for two reasons: 
1. Experience shows that we are intended for survival and 
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2. our actions require both previously mentioned forms of social control 
because of our basic characteristics. 
If we' consider the enormous power of mankind-produced technology 
we must formulate the question: 
1.2. In What lt10dern a Ethics? 
1.2.1. eCi1.not,'Jg:'CCc[ Determinism 
'technical progress conditioned 
its calculus L. 1 . T'his 
cecnnC)lC)gl.CcLl determinism 1S based on an UIlP:ro'ved and false assumption, 
l.e. that it IS 
decisions. 
PO,sS:lble to find 'the one best for t.echnological 
person ';,vho "rrpT\,.<:: this has no reason to judge better or ,xorse 
consequences. to BUul 'The one best VJaY so runs the formula 
to vvhich our t.echnique corresponds. \Vhen everythinghas been measured 
and calculated mathematically so that the method w'hich has been decided 
upon is satisfactory from the rational point of view, from the practical point 
of t.he method is manifestly the most efficient or all those hitherto 
employed or those in competition vlith it, then the technical movement 
becomes self-directing. I call the process automatism.' . 196-J). 
In Ellul's view there are no alternatives in the technological choice and 
choice can be made a priori. Applied into the life of the state technology 
becomes the oniy criterion of action. So political doctrines are merely 
explicative and justifying. It is about only the correctness of the use of 
technology (BLLCL, 1964). 
The crucial point of this argumentation is the 'one best way' for-
mula concerning technological decisions and development. This formula is 
expressed in the slogan of the Chicago 'World Fair of 1933, that science 
discovers, genius invents, industry introduces the new things and we adapt 
ourselves to them and are formed by them (PACE\'. 1983). 
Technological determinism describes technical development as a linear 
progression. But this description rests on arbitrary handling of facts, and 
on disregarding of the possibility of alternative outcomes at the turning 
points. The criticism of this view was developed e. g. by Pacey (PACTY. 
1983). . 
The social constructivist view starts from the assumption of alterna-
tives of technological development and rejects the autonomy of technology. 
It can offer us an acceptable alternative to that. Social constructivists say 
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that 'the social environment, for instance, shapes the technical character-
istics of the artifact'. 
With their emphasis on social shaping, 'they' deny technological de-
terminism. Borrowing and adapting from the sociology of knowledge, they 
argue that the social groups that constitute the social environment play 
a critical role in defining and solving the problems that arise during the 
development of an artifact. '... they' point out that social groups give 
meaning to technology and that problems ... are defined within the con-
text of the meaning assigned by a social group or a combination of social 
groups. Because social groups define the problems of technological devel-
opment, there is flexibility in the -way things are designed, not one best 
way. ...They'... also introduce the concept of closure. Closure occurs 
in science when a consensus emerges that the 'truth' has been winnowed 
from the various interpretations; it occurs in technology when a consensus 
emerges that a problem arising during the development of technology has 
been solved. When the social groups involved in designing and using tech-
nology decide that a problem is solved, they stabilize the technology. The 
result is closure. Closure and stabilization, hoviever, are not isolated events, 
they occur repeatedly during technological development.' (BIJ K ER-P 1:\ CH, 
1990a) 
The relevance of the social constructivist model was demonstrated, 
for example, by reconstructing of development of bicycle and Bakelite. 
(BIJI\:ER PIr;cH 1990b, Bm<ER, 1990) 
Another approach to technological change coming from history of 
technology is the system approach. 'The argument is that those who build 
artifacts do not concern themselves with artifacts alone but must also con-
sider the way in which the artifacts relate to social, economic, political, 
and scientific factors. idl these factors are interrelated, and are potentially 
malleable. The argument is, in other words, that innovators are best seen 
as builders' 
Its originator, T. P. Hughes, gave a good example for its relevance in 
his works. (HCGHES, 1979 and 1983) 
John Lavv' summarizes Hughes' argument as follows: 'Edison's prob-
lem was simultaneously economic, (how to supply electric lighting at a 
price that "would compete with gas), political, (how to persuade politicians 
to permit the development of a power system), technical, (how to mini-
mize the cost of transmitting power by shortening lines, reducing current, 
and increasing voltage) and scientific, (ho-.,,· to find a high resistance in-
candescent bulb filament). That Edison succeeded in resolving this set of 
problems reveals his success as a system builder, and it also shows that, as 
H ughes puts it, 'the web is seamless' that the social was indissolubly linked 
with the technological and the economic' (LA\ .... 1990). 
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This has important consequences regarding engineering activity. This 
model integrates technological and non-technological elements into a com-
plex system. 
As Law says, 'the stability and form of artifacts should be seen as a 
function of the interaction of heterogeneous elements as these are shaped 
and assimilated into a network. In this view, then, an explanation of tech-
nological form rests on a study of both the conditions and the tactics of 
system building. 
Because the tactics depend, as Hughes has suggested, on the interre-
lation of a range of disparate elements of varying degrees of malleability, I 
can such activity heterogeneous engineering and suggest that the product 
can be seen as a netvlOrk of components'. 1990). 
I think the mentioned ar:gumE,nt:s are 
to reject technological determinism. Accepting either of the two versions 
of constructivism we can explain technological development and its ethical 
aspects can be defined. 
If we take engineering as integrating heterogeneous elements 
into a system then the meaning of elements depends on the whole system. 
If that is the case then social, environmental and even moral relations can 
be as important as technological ones. As a consequence of an argument, 
moral aspects of modern technology can legitimately be a focus of our 
interest. 
By means of high technology mankind is able to destroy the living 
conditions on Earth. This enormous power connected viith its application 
requires social assessment from the point of view of our well-being. There-
fore \ve may already pose the question about the relation of ethics and 
technology. 
1.2.2. Five Reasons Why lvf odeTn Technology Is Subject of Ethics 
Hans Jonas listed five reasons why modern technology is a subject of ethics. 
These are 'as follows: 
1. ambiguity of its effects, 
2. necessity of its application, 
3. the global range of its effects (it has far-reaching and long-term con-
sequences) , 
4. going beyond anthropocentricity, 
5. raising the metaphysical question about the survival of humanity. 
(JOI\'AS. 1987). 
A novel approach to ethics is required by the situation produced by the 
above-mentioned features of modern technologies. In his view the approach 
of traditional ethics is not adequate for understanding these phenomena. 
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J onas summarizes the main characteristics of traditional ethics regarding 
technology as follows: 
1. the whole domain of technology is ethically neutral, 
2. anthropocentricity, 
3. the entity 'human being' and its environment is taken as constant 
rather than changing. 
4. Moral norms are related to the immediate environment of the factors 
only. Far-reaching and long-term effects are not taken into account. 
5. Cognitive aspects of moral are limited to common sense. Theoretical 
knowledge as an aspect of morality is out of sight (JOI"A5, 1984). 
We c~n say that these norms of traditional ethics are valid but their 
validity is restricted to face to face relations although even these are influ-
enced by the effects of collective actions, including technology. Therefore 
new dimensions of responsibility have come into existence. 
In his vie.,,,- these are the following: 
1. Vulnera.bility of nature. 'Ne have increased power by means of mod-
ern technology and therefore created responsibility. "What kind of 
responsibility do we have for nature? Are we responsible in a purely 
utilitarian way? That is, we do not want to kill the goose that lays 
the golden eggs, or are we responsible in another way? 
2. Knowledge becomes duty, especially that kind of knowledge will be of 
vital importance by 1Nhich we can predict effects of our technological 
activity. The gap between technological and predictive knowledge 
cannot be filled, and this gap 'Nill be a part of ethics. 
3. Has nature intrinsic moral value? If 'we say yes then this standpoint 
would change our practical and theoretical relation to nature and we 
should have to reconsider the fundamentals of ethics (.]0:\:\5, 1 
IS characteristic of il1oder:J. ethical thmkl,::lg because 
philosophers are divided on the issue. 
According to Jonas, the ethics of technological civilization should be 
future-oriented (JO:\/;.5 1984). 
Searching for a basic principle for his new 'future ethics' Jonas consid-
ers the Kantian categorical imperative: ' Act only on that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law .' 
J onas rejects this kind of imperative because of its logical character: 
'There is no self-contradiction in the idea that mankind will no longer exist 
and therefore there is no self-contradiction in the idea too that the welfare 
of the present or next generation is being bought at the price of misfortune 
or even nonexistence of later generations ... , But the series of generations 
should be continued' (.]ONA5, 1984). 
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Our duty is to respect future generations. From that comes a paradox: 
we must take into account something nonexistent. This requirement goes 
beyond the traditional moral principle of reciprocity, according to that my 
right appears to another person as something to be respected and his/ her 
right is to be respected by me. That is his/her just claim is for me a duty 
to be fulfilled and inversely. 
'But this idea is not appropriate for our purpose. Because something 
can be claimed by existent human beings only . ... But the required ethics 
should deal with nonexistent and its responsibility principle 
should be independent of any idea of right) that of reciprocity as well,' says 
Jonas 1984). So the principle of reciprocity should be abandoned 
and the' future-oriented ethics' extends its responsibility to 
nonexistent future gene:ratH)ns. 
In my opinion of human responsibility should be ex-
inanimate things and processes be-
cause we live in an ecosystem and our activity can rebuild the nature. If 
there is no moral constraint on how we deal w'ith nature, then vie will risk 
our survival because of necessarily allowing global environmental crises. 
That is the reason vvhy modern technology is a subject of moral rea-
soning. So far we have dealt v1ith matters of general morality. Having given 
reasons for a new, future-oriented ethics for our technological civilization I 
think it is time to turn to special moral issues of a technological profession, 
that is to engineering ethics. 
and Ethics 
2.1. From Occupation to Profession 
If we want to speak about special moral aspects of an occupation V'le must 
know 'whether there are professional ethical roles. Or, more completely, we 
want to know whether there are occupations whose defining characteristics 
provide the basis for one or more distinct ethical roles for anyone pursuing 
one of the occupations' (\VI:\DT, 1989). 
Considering the issue our task is to distinguish a profession from an 
occupation. The easiest way is to investigate some occupations which are 
generally taken as professions and their features can be empirical evidences 
for professionalism. Such professions are law and medicine, and they can 
as serve as models for definition. 
Windt lists their features as follows: 
'Expertise. It is characteristic of law and medicine, as well as many 
other plausible candidates for the status of profession, that they involve 
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mastery of a large and complex body of information and skills, which is 
based ona sophisticated theoretical foundation. Extensive education and 
training are required to learn this theoretical foundation and to acquire the 
knowledge and skills that are based on it. 
A uthority. The expertise possessed by the physician or lawyer is fre-
quently expressed in the form of authoritative advice or guidance, that is, 
advice to be followed by patients or clients without their understanding 
why it is good advice, and often in spite of their inclination not to follow 
it. Often, too, members of these professions are called upon to guide the 
information of public policy concerning their areas of expertise in the same 
authoritative way. (It is important to see that expertise and authority are 
two related but different qualities. It is possible to have either one without 
the other.) 
Social importance. The expertise and guidance provided by lawyers 
and physicians are important both to individuals who need their services 
and to society in general. Our health, lives, and liberty depend upon the 
quality of the services provided to us by these professionals. 
A uionomy and self-regulation. Both these professions have been rel-
atively independent of external controls. Standards of acceptable practice 
come from within the professions, and much of the responsibility for main-
taining the quality of practice remains within the professions. These pro-
fessions also control the structure and content of educction and training, as 
vieE as the power to determine who vlill be allowed to enter the profession. 
In addition, individual and have been free to 
choose the kind of service they \vill provide, both in selecting a or 
kind of and in choosing which clients or ','v·ill serve. 
PT'ofessional comm'ii7nenis. 
bers these undertaken 
are "llnr""opr1 
These include a cOTI1mitn1ent to promote the interests and 
the patient or 
of the cOll1ffiunity; a cOlnmitn1ent to prornote excellence 
of their professional arts and skills; and a commitment to 
members of their profession in a fraternal way. These commitments are 
presented in OIle or more codes of ethics, "\,,-hich have been drawn up and 
formally adopted by various professional organizations and their members. 
Rewards. In comparison with other occupations, both law and Ined-
lcme offer a number of substantial rewards, including good economic re-
wards, high social prestige and influence, and the satisfaction that comes 
from engaging in interesting and worthwhile work' (\\"]:\1)T. 1989). 
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The profession is a product of professionalization of an occupation. 
Taking into account the phases of that process it seems to be obvious that 
only some' of the occupations can reach this level. 
According to Wilensky the process of becoming a profession has the 
following stages: 
(1) Became full-time occupation, (2) First training school was estab-
lished, (3) First university school was founded, (4) First local organization 
and (5) First national professional organization were founded. (6) First 
state license law was enacted. (7) First formal code of ethics was adopted 
1964). 
Engineering is relatively new compared to other traditional 'learned 
professions,' law, medicine or ministry. It became a full-time occupation 
in the seventeenth and its first school was 
established in the eighteenth century and its first formal code of ethics was 
adopted in the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Although engineering activity car:. be best seen as 'heterogeneous', 
integrating different technological and social elements into a system, there 
are two potential social roles which can be played by an engineer: (1) 
'technocrat' who 'believes, on the one hand, in the capacity of technology 
to solve all social problems without recourse to value considerations and, on 
the other hand, in the importance of integrating engineers into the political 
power structure of society.' Another role is (2) a 'professional technologist' 
role. In accordance with this role model, an engineer vlOuld be guided 
by an explicit orientation of professional service in his relations with the 
technological system of a society' (EVAN, 1968). 
Evan risks a prediction related to chances of institutionalization of 
the two kinds of role: in democratic societies where an antielitist ethos 
prevails, the professional technologist role has better chances of that; in 
nondemocratic and elitist societies the technocrat role has better chances 
(EVAN, 1968). 
The engineers because of their complex activities cannot work as 
'pure' technologists. The social aspects of their tasks entail moral pro blems 
to be solved, too. 
2.2. Engineering Ethics as Applied Ethics 
'Engineering ethics' is a kind of 'applied ethics' as taken in this paper. In 
my opinion there is no need for a brand-new ethics but there is a need 
for application of general, traditional ethical principles to new conditions 
of technological civilization. Applying general principles to special and 
new situations we have to translate them into a language which can be 
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interpreted by practitioners of technology: They legitimate their practice 
by special conditions: ethicists construct their argument by using general 
terms like justice, equality, respect for nature, etc ... 
The difficult task to be performed is as follows: Considering long-
term and global effects of modern technologies there is a need for a kind 
of 'early -w'arning' of potential problems. This function can be fulfilled by 
an anticipatory applied ethics. The moral void created by autonomous 
technological development should and could be filled by socially acceptable 
technology policy only. (JELS?vfA, 1992). The two functions: the apply-
ing and warning are special features of modern ethics, engineering ethics 
included. 
2.2.1. Applied Ethics Public Policy 
If ,ve look for a chance of realization of moral values we can find it 111 
evaluating. individual and public choices. 
Environment is a common good and reii:lted it public choices are 
proper. Engineering ethics and environmental ethics are partly common 
in their intention and values. Their intention is that their moral assump-
tions are to be integrated into technological processes, devices, projects 
by engineers. Their special values can be taken as translations of general 
moral norms like equity and justice. The common value of both ethics is 
the value of protection of public interest. Both UVCii<2U as of an 
ecologically sustainable 
Let us take a.n 01 
chen1ical plants for many years. 
could 
and not 
for the n1aker 
inhabitants. This is an example of '-..~CC1.1.'.CL"CJ effect 
of one economic effect 
is not reflected in dolicr or market transactions' 
Samuelson and N ordhaus state, ~\iVhatever the SDec:mc approach) the 
general 7'",·"-;,'rI,, for externalities is that '--.f>_.C'-1.U.<L''''.' must be SOIlleho\v iIlter-
nalized. Thus the external costs must be made internal to the decision 
maker if he is to be given the incentives to undertake the efficient amount 
of pollution abatement' (SA:'lUELSO.\--:'\ORD1L-\L:S, 1985). 
There are market and government failures regarding private and col-
lective goods, too. So they should be corrected by several methods. One 
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of the causes of failures is an ethically unacceptable collective decision on 
public goods, or a private decision on private or collective goods. 
There are policies to correct externalities. Two of them are not gov-
ernmental, but private actions: private negotiations and liability rules: 
'Thus, say that I am spilling chemicals upstream from you and doing dam-
age to your fish. In such case, the two of us would have a powerful incentive 
to get together and agree on the efficient level of dumping.' 
:\ORDHAiJS, 1985). 
The 'second approach uses the legal framework rather than govern-
ment intervention is through the liability system. Under this, the gen-
erator of externalities vvouId be legally liable for any damages caused to 
other persons. . .. in most are .n,"rp{1 because of neg-
beha.vior of the driver of 2.n aUitC1TI10ClW:. you can sue for 
(SA~fUELSON- I\ ORDHA us 1985 ) 
There are collective or actions to correct externalities: 
1. Direct controls standards. Their effectiveness is dubious, because 
when setting such standards mostly no cost-benefit analysis is being 
made. Their enforcement is often casual. And standards are not 
properly set and so these rules do not efficiently allocate pollution 
reduction among firms. 
2. Emission or pollution taxes: '... firms would have to pay a tax on 
their pollution equal to the amount of external damage.' 
This is a good kind of regulation, but there are 'only a handful of ex-
ternality taxes, as compared ""Ilith thousands of regulations.' (SA\lUELSON-
:\ORDHAUS, 1985). 
According to Samuelson a reason for failures of US government :s in 
this aspect: 'Unrepresentative Government. In principle democracy is' one 
person one vote'. In practice, dollars win elections. Because money 
talks in politics, we often see programs enacted that confer large average 
benefit on °a small group and exact small average costs from a large group . 
... How is it that a small minority can persuade a majority of the legislature 
to pass programs that benefit a small majority? In many cases, legislators 
face two constraints: votes and money. 
They maximize their popularity subject to the constraint that they 
raise enough money to be reelected ; and the easiest way to raise the ne-
cessary campaign contributions is by voting for a few wellfinanced causes.' 
(SA:vruELSON-NoRDHAUS, 198':». 
Another reason is: 'The bureaucratic imperative: Few can resist the 
temptation to increase their own influence or power. Governments are the 
same. One reason for the tendency of government to overexpand is 
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that there is no profit check (or what business people call 'bottom line') on 
individual projects. 
'If the government builds too many dams, too many bombers, too 
many government office buildings there is no profit or loss statement by 
which the economic worth of these projects can be calculated. The only 
support such projects need is a legislative majority, and this may be ob-
tained by the small minority's providing campaign financing for a sufficient 
number of legislators.' (SAMUELSON-NoRDHAUS, 1985) 
These failures do not mean that we 'should abandon the visible hand 
of the government for the invisible hand of market .... a repaired invisible 
hand may be more efficient than the extremes of either pure laissez faire or 
of unbridled bureaucratic rule making.' (SAMUELSON-NoRDHAUS, 1985). 
The role and function of applied ethics are to help by establishing 
a 'repaired invisible hand' because it is evident that neither market nor 
government can provide us tools for solution of the problem and therefore 
Vie have to work out concepts, strategy and means for our long-term sur-
vival. A part of that is the integration of moral values into the political 
and economic, technological decision-making process. Our task is to create 
the conditions of sustainable growth, which requiring a change in our value 
system. This change should be practical: moral values should get relevance 
in decisions because these express the interests of our long-term survival. 
A double problem should be solved: On the one hand, the traditional 
moral values should be translated into the language of practical matters. 
On the other hand, another problem has emerged: that of the envi-
ronment. If nature has value in itself, then we must make compromises 
in case of value conflict with natural values. I think we must give up the 
traditional instrumental attitude to nature and become committed to eco-
logically sensitive projects which can be sustained. Human beings are a 
part of nature . 
.. 4.nother old-fashioned clain1 of TI1ankind is to GOlninate nature. These 
together can lead the humanity to destruction of its oVl'n conditions, 
to self-destruction. The old private ethics is not enough. The collective of 
government, local authorities and firms need special new branches of ethics. 
Engineering ethics as a special kind of applied ethics must be placed in 
relation to these. 
The characteristic conflicts of engineers come from their social posi-
tion. The engineer as employee in an economic organization fulfils tasks 
given by the management. The firm has to win or at least survive in the 
market competition and its main guiding values are: marketability, eco-
nomic efficiency and profitability. Its survival depends on realization of 
these values, which are different from that of environmental survival. If 
an engineer takes into account other values than that of the market then 
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he can get into conflict with the management. These tensions seem to be 
unavoidable if firms do not change their guidelines. A modification of mar-
ket activity is required: environmental values must be integrated into the 
aims of firms. This process can be a result of governmental policy which is 
an answer to the challenge of organized environmentalists. Therefore, it 
is very important to get consensus in matters of environment, technology, 
energ-j and economy policy so the long-term orientation can be enforced 
by constraints of the market. 
Taking professional commitment seriously, engineers - and only they 
can develop technologies realizing environment friendly technologies. The 
public interest is protected by these technologies. But engineering activity 
as well as managerial activity are tested by the market finally. 
rp, . l.ne malT!. of lE',C;lHCllUlH'S extern2J effects is that future ef-
rects are regularly discounted and their market price cannot be counted 
properly. Therefore it seems to be useful to complete market with plan-
ning. Regarding governmental action we must not have too many illusions. 
But government failures can also be corrected and engineers can make the 
general public informed. They can design, construct and run the requested 
environmentally safe technologies. 
Public pressure plays a vital role in this process. And professional 
honesty of engineers can be decisive in such matters. Engineering societies 
as organizations of professionals take their commitment to public inter-
est seriously and adopt codes of ethics to formulate moral standards of a 
profession, duties and responsibilities connected with it. 
2.2.2. Codes of Ethics for Engineers 
The 'ideal' of true professional described in codes of ethics is the su bJect 
of a professional code of conduct. "Why is it important to formulate that 
for a profession? 
It is an obvious fact that professional occupations have special knowl-
edge and skills vital for the society, for laymen, for the public. Usually 
laymen cannot do what they provide, so members of professions have a 
privileged position. So they claim highlevel financial reward for their ser-
vice to the community. But respect is not automatic, social position is a 
result of a historic process. Therefore occupation must struggle for social 
recognition and it takes long until an occupation becomes profession (as 
we have seen in the previous part.) 
Engineers have to have their reputation accepted in the society and 
later on they have to maintain it. So a code of ethics can demonstrate their 
service orientation and commitment to the public interest for the general 
... -------- ----- ----- -.-
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public. The special ethical role of engineers is to protect the common good 
and this is the common ground upon which professionals agree in general. 
Now I think it is the time to examine a code of conduct which is 
generally accepted as a model for others. It is the' IEEE Code of Ethics 
for Engineers' adopted 1975 by Institute of Electrical and Electronics En-
gineers (FLORES 1980). 
The code has five parts: a preamble and four articles. The preamble 
defines as engineers role that they 'affect the quality of life for all people in 
our complex technological society.' To be professional means for engineers 
ethical conduct in work and therefore to be appreciated by colleagues, 
employers, clients and the public. 
The first article is focused on the engineers and requires that they 
'shall accept responsibility for their actions.' This is of crucial importance 
because all other norms can only be fulfilled if this is taken as valid. Al-
though it is very difficult to state responsibility of an engineer in a way 
which covers specific cases, any moral consideration is useless if engineers 
reject this principle. This code is intended mainly for employee engineers 
and their general problem is the following: an engineer as a member of 
a staff is seldom in a position to decide alone whether a project must be 
realized or not. Besides, modern legal systems are oriented on individual 
responsibility and the issue of corporate responsibility has not been settled 
so far. 
Therefore engineers can pose the question: should I take respon-
sibility for the social consequences of a project, if managers decided on its 
realization without asking my opinion. autonomy requires an-
s\vering this question but to tell the truth this answer has not been found 
so far. 
values connected v;ith conditions of t "h'n 0-
l1c'nc:sty in estiI:nates from available data and 
ing tasks: 
'Undertake engineering tasks and accept responsibility only if quali-
fied training or or after full disclosure to the employers or 
clients of nprT.1lnF'nT. qualifications.' 
Two other valuable activities are to be performed: maintenance of 
professional skill and dignified professional practice for adequate recom-
pensation. 
Article II is about engineers' relation to colleagues and co-workers. 
The basic values are here equality, equal treatment of others, honest critical 
spirit, acc~ptance and offer of honest criticism, readiness to help and assist 
colleagues and coworkers in their professional development, readiness for 
professional enlightenment by reporting, publishing, disseminating freely 
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information to others, subject to legal and proprietary constraints, social 
activity in professional societies and acting according to this code. 
These values belong to an open-minded, democratic, critical, helpful, 
honest and responsible personality embodying the ideal of the professional 
engineer. 
Article IH speaks about the engineer's relation to employers and 
clients. The relevant characteristics are: loyalty in professional and busi-
ness lll,CiLLe:rs, secrecy in business and technical matters, openness revealing 
possible sources of conflict of interest, unbribable personality, readiness for 
technological enlightenment 'Engineers shall '" assist and advise their 
employers or clients in the possible consequences, direct and 
imn1ediate and of the projects~ -vvorks of of \vhich 
have kn.O'.'11E:age. 
of technological en!1~;rn:erlITleI1T IS connected v,ith the 
modern methods of technology assessment. I am not able to decide v,hich 
requirement 1S more difficult to be enforced: the elimination of bribery or 
the day to 
norms. 
dissemination of results of the technology assessment, but 
a chance to future generations We cannot abandon these 
Let me remind you of the unsolVed problems of nuclear ViTaste man-
agement. Professional honesty would require to inform clients and not only 
them but everybody, of its consequences. 
I think the duty of technological enlightenment cannot be limited to 
the engineer-employer, engineer-client relations. If it is about relevant facts 
then all affected persons should be informed, if it is necessary the general 
public, too. 
Article IV describes engineering responsibility to the community. 
There are four norms in this part: 1. Protection of safety, heaith and 
welfare of the community, 2. Public criticism against abuses in these areas 
affecting the public interest; 3. Helping organizations of civil society serving 
public interest and 4. Popularization of the engineering profession. 
Maybe the fourth point is the most important from point of view 
of the engineers, but I think the general public can rather appreciate the 
others. 
Now I make some general remarks. The first problem to be men-
tioned is connected with the fact that this and other codes are enacted 
by the professions themselves. It is possible that a profession knowing its 
dependency from the goodwill of the society adopts a code \vhich contains 
empty rhetoric only and its only function is to improve the image of the pro-
fession. The proper function of codes of ethics is to regulate the behavior 
of its members to satisfy basic needs of the society. 
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The vulnerable society must be certain the professional power will not 
be misused against it. And the main function of ethics and that of applied, 
professional one, too, is the defence of the vulnerable ecosystem, including 
human beings. 
The interpretation of these codes requires professional skill and moral 
sensitivity. The very detailed codes are difficult to be used; the empty and 
general formulations are easy to be misused. A proper code is between the 
two. 
Another problem is their enforcement. It is evident that these norms 
are not legal ones, but they are worth nothing if nobody is bound by them. 
Engineering societies try to enforce them by their means. Their ultimate 
sanction is exclusion from engineering professional organizations but an 
engineer can work without being a member of a professional association 
and so that is not effective enough. 
The other way to achieve their enforcement is, vdlen an engineering 
organization tries to have principles of codes of ethics considered in a legal 
action. For example an engineer was dismissed because he ,vas leaking 
information about a project which was threatening lives and health of the 
public. Because he was not loyal to the firm, it did not care about reason 
of leaking and fired him. 
If the court rules that dismissing an engineer because of his adherence 
to norms of the code of ethics is breaching labour contract by the firm, then 
chances of enforcement of codes of ethics will increase. 
30 COllClusiol1S 
frOE} 
civilization needs a ne\v kind of ethics 
nlodern technology. This future oriented ethics of our ti!11e 111USt be CL kind 
of responsibility ethics: because of global and effects of 1110dern 
technology w'e must take responsibility for future yet nonexistent genera-
tions and for nature, too. The reciprocity as the main moral 
principle should be replaced by this new kind of responsibility principle. 
Engineering ethics as a kind of applied ethics should be related to pu b-
lie choices and matters of environment, too, and therefore its 'translated' 
general principles must be completed by environmental values. 
The ideal of engineer described in codes of ethics for engineers should 
be taken seriously because of his/her contribution for establishing the sus-
tainable growth which is the only way of survival for the mankind. 
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